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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of funding contracts on the capacity of
third-sector organizations to effectively advocate. The relationship is not
simple or obvious, with some organizations reporting 'mature relationships'
with particular (state) departments, and others reporting difficulty with state
or federal government jurisdictions. The paper spells out the negative
effects of conflating service funding and advocacy. The paper concludes
by exploring alternative institutional arrangements for the resourcing of
advocacy including the establishment of a Public Interest Fund administered
independently of any government department, one not requiring specific
service contracts but rather evidence that it is advocating for the broader
public good. ;
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This paper examines the effect of funding contracts on the capacity of
organizations to effectively advocate. The \Xlper begins with issues of definition
and examines the evidence from other studies. It then introduces the empirical
study based on in-depth interviews that forms the basis of this paper. The
relationship between funding and capacity to advoclte is not simple or obvious,
with some organizations reporting 'mature relationships' with particular (state)
depa rtments, a nd others reporting difficulty wi th st<1te or federa I govern ment
jurisdictions. The paper spells out the negative effects of conflating service
funding and advocacy. It concludes by exploring alternative institutional
arrangements for the resourcing of advocacy.
We use the term 'third-sector' to identify those organisations that may be
funded by government, but are legally independent of them, and excluding
political parties. They are also non-profit, being creatures of neither the state
nor the market. The term 'Advocacy' is defined as active interventions by
organisations on behalf of the collective interests they represent, that have the
explicit goal of influencing public policy or the decisions of any institutional
elite (Casey and Dalton 2006, Onyx and Dalton 2006, Salamon 2002). These
activities may be high profile and openly political acts, or they may be low
profile, more discrete processes of influence; they may be aimed directly at
the decisiol1 makers, or they may be aimed at influencing by proxy through
public opinion or voter intentions. Analogous terms such as activism, advising,
campaigning, commenting, consulting, dialogue, engagement, feedbach, giving
voice, influencing, input, lobbying, negotiation, participation, fJolicy worl<,
promoting improvements and social action are also used to describe the direct
influencing processes, while terms such as educating, disseminating information
and informing are used for indirect processes. While there are differences in
meanings of all these terms, they are often used interchangeably and there are
variations in their usage between different jurisdictions and interest areas. The
terms used to describe any of these activities are often more the result of which
labels sit comfortably with the participants involved than of any strict academic
definition.
Two aspects of advocacy are particularly noteworthy: first, the emphasis on
private, as well as governmental, institutions as the objects of advocacy activity
and second, the focus on 'collective interest', on benefits that in Berry's terms,
'may be shared by all people, independent of their membership or support of
a given group', rather than private benefits, as the principal goal of advocacy
activity (Berry 1977: 8). Within this second, 'collective interest' category
advocacy activity involves a wide repertoire of strategies from the more radical
or non-institutional tactics such as staging protests and sit-ins to the increasingly
common institutional tactics such as responding to government submissions
and participating in government committees <lnd enquiries, education training
and research activities, anc!media activity. The US Filer Commission ('1975)
identified five related activities: 'developing public policy', 'supporting minorit)'
or local interests', 'overseeing governmenr', 'bringing sectors together' and
'furthering active citizenship and altruism'.
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In an earlier study, Melville notes the distinction between lobbying and advocacy
made in the political science and third-sector literature (Melville & Perkins,
2003:88). According to Hopkins (1992:32) advocacy is
The act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting
or recommending a position [by whichl advocacy is the active
espousal of a position, a point of view or a course of action
(cited in Boris & Williams: 1998:501).
[n contrast, lobbying is defined as attemptin'g to influence legislators with a view
to impacting on their congressional votes (Hopkins 1992:32 cited in Boris and
Mosher-Williams, 1998:501).
'Issues around advocacy in the third sector are of pressing concern not least
because of the ways it supports the robust functioning of democracy. By
engaging in advocacy third sector organisations can contribute to democracy in
two key ways. First, by schooling those that participate in them in democratic
practices and by providing an environment where they can learn about political
issues or participate in political action (Verba et al. 1995) or as Warren has
expressed it 'Associations cultivate the habits of collective action, thus producing
an active, self-sufficient, and vigilant citizenry' (Warren 2001: 6). Second, by
ensuring that the views and voices of all interests are represented in the policy
process (Boris and Mosher-Williams, 1998; Berry 1999; Sawer 2002).
A further important point to note about the current study is the distinction
made between individual advocacy and systemic advocacy. The current
study focused on systemic advocacy aimed at the organisational and
institutional-political levels, which is pleading for a collective interest or
cause, rather than pleading the cause of a specific (disadvantaged) individual.
While the two may be linked, it is systemic advocacy that attempts to remedy
the underlying cause of disadvantage, rather than ameliorating its effect in a
particular case.
The Relationship Between Government Funder and Third-sector
Funding is an issue for all third-sector organisations. [t is particularly an issue
for those human service and environmental organisations that both depend
on government funding to conduct their business, and also wish to engage in
systemic advocacy on behalf of their target group. However the relationship
between organisation and government funding body is not simple or uniform
across all jurisdictions.
A significant amount of analytical work on how contracting and project-based
funding regimes have affected the ability of peak organisations in Australia
to lobby and undertake advocacy work on behalf of their members has been
conducted by Melville (1999,200 I). More recent research that has examined
the effects on reliance on government funding on capacity to conduct advocacy
has been inconclusive (Casey and Dalton 2006). Dalton and Lyons (2005)
found that reliance on government funding among advocacy organisations
had not affected their commitment to advocacy. Instead, the study found that
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organisations that rely substantially on government funds continue to devote
significlnt resources to advocacy work and the CEOs of these organisations
expressed a desire to do more advocacy work if possible. This finding suggests
that there may alw<lYs be a gap between organisational commitment to ,1dvoClcy
and the resources availahle to support such commitment. Other recent work
in the US suggests that government funding has either no affect, or even a
slightly positive effect on advocacy, as any suppression imp,lct is outweighed
by the government's dependence on the community organisations it funds
and the self-interest of funded org,lnisations to promote policy changes <limed
at improving the Iives of cI ients, which genera lIy augment the organ iza tion's
resources (Chaves et al. 2004). Salamon (2002) argues that those nonprofits
that take a collaborative view of policy making (as opposed to a conflict view),
are able to increase these collaborative opportunities with increased government
funding.
On the other hand some researchers have documented the restriction on
community organisations and the repercussions they fear may be incurred
by speaking out (Melville 2001) One particularly influential report and book
by the Australia Institute, titled Silencing Dissent (Maddison, Denniss and
Hamilton 2004), focuses on the perils faced not only by community sector
organisatiJns but all NGOs if they dare to 'bite the hand that feeds'. In a related
article Maddison and Denniss (2005) speak of the 'long arms' of government
constraining the advocacy work of third sector organisations. What is missing
from the latter work is a nuanced analysis of the way in which the institutional
state-funding relationships impact on the 'silencing' of disadvantaged groups.
It may be that some large conservative third sector organisations find it easier
under current funding regimes than do small, or non-institutional organisations.
It may also be that governments in some jurisdictions may be more welcoming
of advocacy than others. Finally, it is possible that funding from line
management government departments is more often used to constrain advocacy
that funding from other sources. The present study examines systemic advocacy
within the context of the institutional relationships between the policy actors
- adVOGlcy organisations and the state. The paper concludes by examining
alternative funding models for advocacy.
Method
.'
The paper presents an analysis of in-depth interviews with senior executives
of 24 third-sector organisations, '16 in NSW and !3 in Queensland, from
across the human services and the environment 'industries'. To maximise
coverage of diverse organisations, four organisation clusters were selected, to
represent distinct service fields. Our industry partners were actively involved
in determining these fields for our case study sample selection. The four fields
identified and targeted by the rescarch team include: housing/ home!essncss,
disability, child and family welfare and the environmcnt. Two of thesc fields
(disability and child and family welfare) were also used for sample selection in
Queensland. These four fields are major sites of cOll1munity sector institutional
n:forms, social and political stress, and political contestation.
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Within each field cluster four organisations were identified, reflecting a range
of large and small organisations, and representing those reputed to use more
'institutional' or 'non-institutional' approaches. The purpose of this distinction
was to capture potential differences by size and organiz,ltional type on forms
of advocacy, as well as potential differences between State jurisdictions. In all
cases the organisations were selected on the basis of receiving state government
funding. However, in practice most organisations also received (or used to
receive) a variety of other funding including from Commonwealth sources and
from a variety of fees and services. .-
While our sample concerns advocacy rather than service delivery, there is no
easy way of delineating between service orientated and advocacy oriented
organisations. This reflects broader research in the field where estimating the
exact proportion of organisations that have advocacy as their main objective
has proved difficult, and figures vary widely between researchers (Knoke 1990,
Van Deth 1997, Melville 200 I). All of our respondents, regardless of the degree
of service orientation, identified their organisations as advocacy organisations
- that is they all claimed that seeking to influence government policies for the
improvement of their constituents was an organisational goal. However most
were careful to explain that government funding for service delivery was not
directly used for advocacy.
To inform the analysis we adopted a case method approach of the 24
organisations in NSW and Queensland. The case studies involved some
observation as well as the identification of relevant minute~, correspondence and
other secondary documentation, and in-depth interviews with key informants
(ten Have 2004). While the larger case material informs this paper, the
focus here is on the interview material. All informants were asked a series of
standardized but open ended questions. The analysis is based on the responses
to questions concerning the nature of the organisations' advocacy, source of
funding and relationships to government. The responses reflect the perception of
these key informants, based on their direct experience in their organisations. The
responses were de-identified to protect the identity of individual organisations.
The analysis highlights the diverse ways that groups interact with government
funding agencies and how funding relationships mayor may not affect the
perception of the capacity of nonprohts to engage in advocacy. It should be
noted that the interviews took place during 2006-2007 and therefore were
affected by the political landscape of the clay, both nationally (the end of the
"Howard era") and at state level (eg the recent introduction of new disability
legislation in Queensland). Nonetheless, the emerging themes suggest a more
generic phenomenon.
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Results
Homelessness and Housing
Each of the organizations described its relationship with the state government as
good, but ever changing. Access varies greatly depending on the minister. One
organization found it "impossible" to get a meeting with the minister, another
had three meetings yearly.
Working up the options, working up what will work together
has ... been a standard way of working between the government
and the non-government sector when it is working effectively
and has been our experience in this sector (but) that has changed
dramatically. (Head, medium NSW organisation)
Advocacy wins of late seem to be more about tweaking existing policy than
influencing draft policy. Most felt that it was their presence on departmental
committees that offered the best scope for lobbying for changes. However, one
organisation is questioning its role (as are others) on a departmental reference
group because of rules preventing consultation with constituents.
We are being compromised by government being able to say:
'We are consulting with the sector.' But they are not. They are
con~ultingwith a group of people who are hog tied and who
cannot take that information out and actually talk more broadly
and get input from members (CEO small NSW organisation).
Two of the organizations have explicit non-adversarial stances when it comes
to using the media, voluntarily alerting government and the bureaucracy when
they plan to issue media releases. 'We want to change their mind, not ambush
them,' said one HO executive of a group that has had its funding threatened in
the past.
Three organizations expressed the perception that some peak organisations are
constrained under contractual obligations to the Commonwealth government,
including advance notice to the minister of submissions, media releases and
commenta ry.
The Commonwealth is 'leaning very much toward ... contracting out from
government, roles government departments once would have had and paying
less wages, but then taking-from the non-government sector any of the capacity
to act ... locally with their own initiative and to advocate on their clients'
(behalf),' said one executive of a small NSW organisation ..
Environmental Organisations
Of the four environmental organizations we talked to, two engaged in direct and
overt activism and campaigning, while two preferred to work more discretely
behind the scenes, offering advice to government and members, and providing
support and advice to other environmental groups. All four organizations
had direct or indirect relationships with all levels of government, hut were
heavily focused on relationships with Statc Government departmcnts and
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Parliament. Ivlost reported a reasonably mature and sophisticated relationship
with the state government, in which they received some funding, offered
some services, hut maintained the capacity for fearless critique. Relationships
with the Commonwealth Government were more problematic and difficult,
and had gcncralh· entailed a loss or reduction in funding. Local government
councils ~vcre a s'mall hut growing target for some organizations, and for one
small organization the private, corporate sector was becoming a major target
of advocacy activiti<:s, particularly information giving, debate and training.
All organizations engaged <:xtensively in various forms of public education
progra ms t'O ra ise awa rcness of en vi ron menta I issues. Some focused on in-house
or external puhlications, others on workshops and training seminars, and others
focused lI10re on media events and public action.
Three of the org:lnizarions now relied on funding that was largely independent
of government. Such funding was derived from consultancies, member fees
and donations, and funding from the NSW Public Purpose Fund. All regarded
this independent Source of funding as an important basis for their capacity
to :ldvncate freeh· and to publiclv criticize government actions. Government
funding was Iarg~ly restricted to 'education~1 programs or specific research
projects carried out hy rhe ()rganization, which is on projects in which the
ohjectives of governmenr and of the organization coincided. However one
large, Illt'lnhership hased, peak organizarion remained dependent on the state
government for 80%, of its funding, including that used for direct advocacy
campaigns. While the organization h:15 enjoyed largely posi;ive relations with
most state government departments in the past, tensions have recently arisen
when the organization directly opposed an intended government action.
I took some notes from the meeting and they pretty mllch said
we don't want to hear that you are opposed Ito water trading/,
we want to hear constructive ladvicel ....That is the first time I've
really encounter<:d government really waming to control things
:lIld it is coming from a department which is normally an ally
for LIS (CEO large NSW organisation)
Disabilities
All four of the CEOs of the NS\Xf or~anisations acrivc in providing services and
reprcselHing the interec;ts of people With disabilities noted differences between
their organisation's relationship with Federal :lnd Stare governments. Echoing the
si tlIa tion in rhe other c1ustcr~, a II reported a rcason:1 hi y IIIatu re and cooperati ve
relatiol1ship with th,c St~I~C (Iovcrnn~cnt but l1lor.~ srrained relationships with
some Federal agenclcs. I he two n1(\1I1 reasons oftered fur the difference in the
State and Federal governrncnr rcl.ltionships were stru\.'tural and pOlitical.
In tel'l11S of structural factors shaping the respcctive relationships CEOs of the
organisations norell ho\~' tht,)' opcr,\ted an~It.()r were largel)' funded at either a
nati(lILll or state level. "or example, o,ne CI:.O of a large peak organisation s:licl
that Feder:t1 Departmcnts only dt'.d With the organisation vi:l their national peak
hody.
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It used to be that the Department actually h~ld a direct contract
with us but now Ithe Federal Deptl just wants to deal with Ithe
national peakl :.lnd then the peak will sub-contract to us (CEO,
brge NSW organisation)
Several political factors were also identified as shaping the relationship. Three
of the CEOs (2 from sm~ll1 organisations :.lnd one from <1 large organis:.ltion)
interviewed expressed concern about federal government departments more
actively seeking to control advocacy activities, using words such as 'compliance'
and 'accountability' and 'micro-m<lnagement':
I do think at the national level they're tightening up and
negotiations are more protracted and micro managed every bit
needs to be carefully negotiated.
(CEO brge NSW organisation)
One CEO of a small organisation contrasted the state and federal relationship in
the following way:
The State might not like us, and they might try to defund
us and go through all these spurts, but r think overall, their
rela,tionship is much smarter than the Commonwealth - the
COI'nmonwealth really has the desire to control the voice of
the people and to discourage doing systemic stuff.... I mean
this is what Ruddock said one day: 'I'm the systemic advocate
for migrants, we don't need to fund thcm.' (CEO, small NSW
organisation)
Two organisations also noted that in general Federal Government funding was
principally directed at supporting individual advocacy work. One CEO argued
that this was because it :.lligns with the Liberal Federal Government's view of
'clients as individuals'. The CEO said that they felt that this had consequences
for organis<ltions whose principal activity was systemic advocacy such as peaks:
J think some uf the national peaks are worried. If you talked to
our national peak I think they have some worries. For us, it is
nut a big deal because we do individual advocacy so we are so
grounded ... 1f we are not doing individual advocacy, I think you
are in trouble and L. have a sense that that will be on the agenda.
(CEO slmll NSW organisation).
Relationships between different levels of government seem to vary across the
two state jurisdictions. For example, onc CEO from Queensland talked about
how their organisation was able to use personal access to try and influence
government policy, especially through personal contacts with the ministcr, and
senior bureaucr<1t's.
It is a bit of everything. Usually or not always, I would takc a
mcmber or maybe two or three members of our committee who
all :1I"C CEOs of mcmber organisations - If that was to go and
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sec the minister. I would see minister's advisors on a much more
regular hasis. Deal with senior bureaucrats very regularly (CEO,
Quecnsland peak body Organisation)
Thl'\' also had ;1 scat at the table - in a sense that they were part of a select
grell'lp of org:l11is;ltions that were invited to advise the minister and state
hureaucrats on issues.
No it's really ;1 conversation with senior bureaucrats and in Org
1\, rherc is I~rohably four of comn.'nee that is also represented <-
on that group ... That is actLI::dly more of a regular conversation
every eighr weeks where they table what they are thinking, we
gct :; ch:lnce to respond to it and put our issues on the table,
'1'h:1I is a useful forum in that there is a lot of robust debate goes
Oil there and there is an understanding that the relationship will
withstand that (CEO, Queensland peak body Organisation ).
On rill' other hand, t"vo of the disability organisations in Queensland noted
that thcir relatiunships with both state and federal government were often
prohlcll1atic, especially when it came to lobbying and advocacy work. Neither
govcrnment seemed open to the organisations exercising their 'voice', force
'prurnotional' or cause related advocacy. One organisation offered the following
explanation ahout the ch:lnge at the state government level.
The level of politically interference or political influencing in the
public service has increased quite dramatically in both the state
and federCil levels of government and part of that I guess does
relate to how long the government is in power. You tend to find
if ministers parricularly stay in a portfolio for more than about
three yeCirs they start to have much more control over what's
hClppening and rheir advisors tend to have a lot more say in
what's happening than what you do if that isn't the case (CEO
large Queensland organisation).
/\norher CEO of a small disability organisation in Queensland was just as
criticl1 of the state and federal government, which they saw as having little
roleralH:e towards strong advucacy organisations, This respondent saw the
'change' in terms of the way in which disabled people are viewed in society,
This respondent suggested that Ministers and bureaucrats :IS well as some
strong advocates of family carer's of disabled people were moving away from
a 'rights' based discourse to One which viewed disabled people as a 'burden
oIl society' and wanted to re-introduce policies and programs that 'put away
agail: in l.arge in.stitu,tions'. Not surprisingly this organisation has experienced
the 'fundl11g. reviews an.d oven: threats about the continuity of their funding
h;ld been raIsed ~lt meetlllgs wirh ministers and bureaucrats. The organisation
ILlS heen at~elllpting to build strategic alliances with powerful inter~st groups
:1l1d profeSSIOnals as n wny to CClunt"cract this pressure and ensure its on-going
survi\'C11. <-
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Families and Children
In recent years, the field of child and family welfare has been fraught with major
systemic crises and controversies. These include state and federal inquiries into
systemic abuse within state run and private institutions, major funding cuts in
services, greater media and public scrutiny of children at risk, ,md an increasing
sense of a system in perpetual crisis. Nearly every state and territory jurisdiction
has held inquiries into foster care or child abuse. For example, the Report of the
Qld Crime and Misconduct Commission into the Abuse of Children in Foster
Care (2003); and the Report on the National Inquiry into the Separation of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and their Families (1997). In this
kind of volatile environment, there were windows of opportunity for third sector
organisations to have considerable impact into policy, if they can be seen as a
source of solutions and not just rasing problems.
I think is about taking up opportunities there are and making
opportunities to have discussions - informed about opening
up windows into there being a different way of seeing this
and how can we solve this problems (CEO small organisation,
Queensland)
Although we still raise problems, we have learned that very
bus)~ bureaucrats aren't interested in hearing about the problems
unless there is a solution, so we go with a problem and a
suggested solution. (CEO of small NSW organisation)
The following quotations demonstrate the sophisticated understanding of some
people in the non-government sector about endemic and systemic problems in
the field and in the relationships between the state and the non-government
sector.
Vie have a system whose responsibility lies with government
and the non-government sector are increasingly for service
delivery .... and policy is only as good as your implementation ...
and the implementation arm of government and non-government
sector as a whole - how can we make it the best it can be? How
can we work together, so it is not about having conversations
around [what] you are not doing? This is about system is failing
in this area how call. we plug it up? (CEO small organisation,
Queensland).
However, the reality didn't match up with the practice. Policy is seen to be
dominated by the state with minimal input from the community sector. For
example, one CW stated:
We always try and maintain a respectful relationship because
government objectives and our objectives ... we are working for
the same things and if you believe that: the government are a
public servicing the public and our community, so we try ,md
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remain respectful in that way, but there are frustrations and
we often leave a meeting swearing. (CW medium Queensland
organisation)
We are playing, we are trying to include them as an equal
partner, but they only partner us when it suits them (CEO NSW
small organisation)
A major theme emerging in the data was the silencing of criticism and advocacy
by human service organisations at the sta're government level, and not just the
federal government levels. One CEO noted that there was a general perception
amongst the community sector that the government was silencing dissent, but
they argued that the real contestation going on was not the silencing of dissent,
but rather control over policy formation and implementation.
Depending on who you talk to people will tell you - you are
not allowed to do advocacy anyway. [ don't believe that I must
admit. If anyone told me I couldn't do advocacy I would just
ignore it, I wouldn't argue I would just walk out the door. It is
individual [people] more than the government. I don't think the
government really has that position, really wants to silence the
non-government sector on advocacy about people's lives. This is
the debate going on about whose right is it to form government
policy, but I don't think the government likes being criticised
about their policy. (CW small Queensland organisation)
Bur in general, organisations within this cluster chose to ~10ve very cautiously
when it came to matters of systemic advocacy. Most organisations kept a low
media profile for this reason. Comments consistently reflected this caution:
We have to ensure that our relationship with government doesn't
get out of control. ..We're always very conscious that our biggest
funding source is government. It wouldn't stop us on a matter
of principle, but it makes us choose the issues that we fight very
carefully. (Executive large NSW organisation)
This organisation, and other large organisations, are careful to use self-funding
sources for advocacy, but also, where possible, to work through alliances with
other third sector organisations.
One service organisation had developed an interesting strategy to deal with the
contentious issue of 'political advocacy' for homeless and disadvantaged young
mothers, and what they termed 'human service advocacy'. The users of the
scrvice were encouraged to put forward several coherent policy options when
thc)' were speaking to government 'as members of a group', but they were also
elh:ouragt'd to take lip individual positions outside the group as citizens. This
approach tended to ameliorate some of the problems when multiple voices S<lY
diffcrem rhings and all of rhem 'claim to represent disadvantaged people'.
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However, overall it was salutary to note, that in the field of children and
families in general the government was not willing to involve the community
sector in the development of policy making (the focus of much contemporary
advocacy work), <1nd fmthermore, waS not particularly inclined to involve thelll
in the implementation phase of policy development. Advocacy work around
policy making and policy input was still a major point of contention between
line agencies and the third sector organisations the state funded.
Discussion
The findings suggest that these third sector organisations adopt a variety
of strcltegies for advocacy, with many organisations using both direct and
indirect means to establish a working relationship with government, but also
to challenge what they see as negative government policies. ]t takes time to
establish an effective relationship, and all organisations noted the challenge of
resomcing long-term programs with short-term contract/project based funding.
This is in keeping with the findings of earlier work by the authors Casey and
Dalton (2004) and by Earles (1999), Melville and Perkins (2003), Melville
(2001, 1999), Sawer (2002) and Lyons (1997) on the impact of project-based
and competitive tendering funding regimes on the advocacy dimension of the
work of the!Australian community sector.
However, apart from the length of funding, the conditions of funding are
also problematic for advocacy. The new models of government funding in
effect mean that most advocacy can only be funded from the shrinking pool
of uncommitted funds, private membership or fundraising, even for those
peaks who are funded to carry out broader, advocacy related work. There is a
perception that any use of government funds for certain advocacy functions Illay
lead to de-funding, or removal of tax- exempt status". According to one CEO,
the organisation has developed a creative apprO<1Ch to funding advocacy from
federal sources 'They don't want us to do a lot of systemic work so we squeeze
it out of other bits ... so we are very creative about how we report' (CEO small
disahilities organisation in NSW).
One CEO, of a large NSW disabilities organisation did make the point that
growing dependency also represents an opportunity. While organisations may
be dependent on government funding, governments are increasingly dependent
on third sector organisation~~ for their own service delivery commitments. ant'
organis<ltion noted a growing dependency on the sector did strengthen the
sector's position vis-a-via government:
Because government departments are pushing more things onto
NGOs, in a funny way the flip side of that is 1 think government
departments need NGOs in some ways more than they might
have in the past as well. It might be dependence, but it goes
both ways. (CEO, large NSW organisation).
In f:1I:t an organi~,ation th:lI' has tax l'Xl'Il1Pt st:HlIS hy virrlll' of hl'ing a charity risks loosing
thai statlls hy l'xtl'nsivl' advocacy rl'g:lrdkss of whlthl'r it rl'cl'ivl's gOVl'rnnll'l1t fllllliing
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An interesting issue raised by research participants in this study is the way in
which they defined advocacy. for example, a number of participants defined
advocacy in terms of influencing policy making and implementation and not in
the more conventional forms of 'political advocacy work'.
Well maybe we don't do advocacy, maybe what I see the role of
something like a critical friend, adding another dimension to the
debate (small Queensland organisation)
It indicates that some organisations have ·tleveloped quite strategic approaches to
undertaking advocacy work within a more conservative political environment.
For example, several organisations in this study were active on government
committees of one sort or another, although opinion is divided as to whether
this is an effective advocacy tool or not. For some, a personal relationship
with the Department is the major channel for maintaining a strong input into
government policy before it becomes fixed in concrete:
Personally I think it does get down to personal relationships
and that in terms of the partnership that you are involved in
and I would say they are very much partnerships in terms of
the projects that we are involved in. Partnerships to the extent
where if I see an issue emerging somewhere that is potentially
going to be a problem then [ will just ring the director and say
I can see this coming or this isn't going to go down well we
need to deal with this and they will deal with it really quickly.
Similarly that is the sort of relationship we have !fO we have
some formal processes in place but there are also the informal
conversations probably. (CEO large Queensland organisation)
Governments of all persuasions were more receptive to negotiations behind
the scenes, with representatives of many key third sector organisations sitting
on various government committees. This provided them with opportunities for
policy impact, which some organisations valued. For others committee work is
an extremely time consuming process which deflects energy from more direct
advocacy. Some organisations expressed a frustration that by taking part in a
committee, they were largely co-opted into the government agenda, with reduced
capacity for independent critique. One condition of being on these committees
was that they could not consult with other third sector organisations, or claim
to represent a wider constituency.
All organisations interviewed across four clusters or types of organisation
and two States, expressed a belief that relationships with the Commonwealth
government was difficult, most funding for advocacy work had been reduced
or removed, and there was considerable pressure to support government policy
or remain silent. Relationships with State Government Departments were more
"mature", a term frequently used by respondents. By this was meant th~lt
most State Departments were willing to engage with dissenting advice, while
still providing considerable funding, although this also varied by Department
~lIH.I by issue. NSW State Departments appear to be more accepting of third
SCL'tor advocacy than is the case in Queensland, perhaps because the sector in
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NSW is large and well established. In practice there appears to be decreasing
tolerance to 'political advocacy' by organisations funded by state governments.
The line between the community sector human service organisations and the
state is increasingly blurred. This is quite evident in Queensland, where the
state Premier, conflated state human services organisations (health, educ.ltion
and welfare) with non-government community sector organisations. He
incorrectly refers to all of them .1S 'the community sector service providers' (Qld
Government, 1998).2
Overall, there is some support for the position that government funding may
have a slightly positive effect, as any suppression impact is outweighed by the
government's dependence on the community organisations it funds (Dalton
and Lyons 2005; Chaves et al. 2004). Thus, organisations may be able to
advocate in areas that do not directly challenge government policy. Their
opinions may be sought on committees and in developing responses to specific
emerging problems. In these cases, they are, as Salamon (2002) suggests, acting
as collaborative partners in policy making. Still the repeated usc of words
such as 'compliance' and 'accountability' and 'micro-management' suggest
concern with government funders remains and runs deep. It appears that
such collaboration disappears when advocacy organisations seek to challenge
existing polky, or place new items on the policy agenda. Some departments,
in some jurisdictions are willing to allow such challenges, but others are not.
Even where collaboration does occur, the advocacy organisation is limited in
their capacity to consult with other third sector organisations, and/or to make
media statements. In these cases, it does appear that dependency on governmenr
funding places strong limits on the form and extent of allowable advocaC)l.
An Alternative Funding Model
For most organisations it is simply not feasible to obtain significant funding
from non-government sources while maintaining an advocacy program. The
most obvious source of non-government funding is self-funding; usually in
the case of peak organisations this refers to levies or contribution drawn from
member organisation. However those member organisations are rarely in a
position to contribute significant funds as they are themselves struggling ro
meet enormous service demands with inadequate funding. Even where the
advocacy program is funded from independent sources, but where the main
service delivery is funded from government sources, that dependency renders
the organisation vulnerable to government pressure, and the perceived threat
of losing tax exempt status. This of course varies enormously depending on.
which department, what kind of advocacy and what level of government. It
organisations are to maintain the capacity to provide 'frank and fearless' ;ltkicl'
and to provide appropriate systemic advocacy for their constituencies, thell they
need to be able to access alternative resources to do so, ones not tied directly to
line managcmcnt government control.
1 Unitl:d Sratl's researchers Hal and NaIK)' Lawson report' :In increasing hlurring of hound:1ries
helween rill' sr:lle and nOll profirs ill their most ITcelll research ill rhe child alld famil)'
welfare field.
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However an alternative model of funding does already exist, one that appcars
to cut through the mechanisms that compromise the capacity of organisations
for systemic advocacy. That alternative model is the Public Purpose: Fund in
NSW. Other Sra tes have similar funds, though they ma y be na med di fferen tl y.
The NSW fund is established under NSW State legislation, but is kept at arms
length from any government department. The Fund is made up of 'all interest
on money in any general trust account at an ADI (Authorised Deposit-taking
Institution) [whichl is payable to the La~ Society' for the Public Purpose
Account (NSW, Legal Profession Act 2004). This potentially amounts to tens
of millions of dollars. The Fund is m::ln::lged ::Ind controlled by 4 Trustees, the
Director General and three appointees of the Attorney General, two of whom
are nominees of the President of the Law Society.
The Funding is available for ::Iny recognized public purpose, within the field of
Law and legal practice. The process for application requires a report of past
activities, and a statement of proposal for use of the funding for the period
sought (in some cases this is a three year period). It appears that the trustees
have the broad discretion to determine allocation for funding that is used for the
public good. The Act specifies a number of activities that can be appropriately
funded. They include: legal education, law reform, improved access to legal
information and services. Systemic advocacy is broadly endorsed. The Law
Society Council includes a copy of the annual report of income and expenditure
of the Public Purpose Fund in its own annual report. Funded organisations are
expected to submit copies of their annual report, and otber evidence of effective
focus to the Public Purpose Fund Trustees. However, rep'orting is not onerous or
tied to a predetermined government agenda. We came across three organisations
that were funded in this way, and they were among the most effective in terms
of advocacy programs.
While the Public Purpose Fund is largely limited to matters relating to the Law,
there is no reason why similar Public Purpose Funds could not be created in
other jurisdictions. For example, there is currently money accrued from interest
on Bonds payed for rental property. There are likely to be similar moneys
elsewhere, i.e. funds accrued that are 'untouchable by ::Iny p::lrty'. They would
need to be tied to a fiscal base, perhaps a tax base, but drawn from 'return on
investment' funds. They could well be made available for broad public interest
advocacy organisations in all fields of human and environmental services. Such
Funds would need government oversight, but at a step removed from the hurly
burly of political operational engagement.
This is not to argue for reduced accountability for advocacy funding,
but only for ,1 redirection of upward accountability away from the direct
line-management department concerned with service provision. The proposed
funding model does not jeopardise accountability - particularly if a more holistic
understanding of accountability is assumed. That is that there is both upward
and downward accountability.
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Traditional conceptions have a relatively narrow view of accountability, which
provides only those who wield formal authority over the organization with
the right to hold them to account (Kovach et al. 2003: 3). Generally in the
third sector, these traditions apply, and accountability lines run upward to the
same dep<utment that is responsible for service provision funding. Ebrahim
(2003) who has done an extensive review of third sector <lCcountability
mechanisms points out that mechanisms to enhance accountability downwards
to constituencies being served remain comparatively underdeveloped. Thus
the accountability system prioritizes certain relationships over others, usually
in favour of the donor or the certification body, rather than in favour of the
beneficiaries. Johnson refers to this as the "accountability gap" (Johnson 2001).
One issue here concerns the likely recipient of Public Purpose Funding. If
funding is limited to peak organisations, and not also made available for
advocacy activities in other, service delivery organisations, then it may have the
unintended effect of actually reducing the capacity to advocate among the rank
and file organisation and so divorce advocacy from service delivery further. Yet
a major strength of the third sector is that its advocacy is informed by direct,
grounded experience derived through service delivery, as well as via the broader
analysis of peaks.
•Another issL;e is that, while the proposed model is b<lsed on State funds, the
respondents in the study were much more critical of Commonwealth than Statt'
government interference. This suggests that such an "Advocacy Public Purpuse
Fund" would need to cross State boundaries, and preferably be drawn from the
Commonwealth, <lgain with bro<1d but indirect oversight. It would also suggest"
that such a fund would need to be Luge enough to encompass the many needs
of a diverse sector and its defence of social justice and the environment. With a
change to a new Labour Commonwealth Government, such a national advocacy
public purpose fund may become possible.
The model in many ways is in keeping with the growing trend by the forllllT
Commonwealth Government to establish a large investment of a base capital
with interest from that investment funding continuing activities such as
Aborigin<11 Land Councils, The Futures Fund, and the University EndowmelH
fund. Endowment funds involve a transfer of 11l0ney or property don<1ted to
an institution, with the stip!-llation that it be invested, and the principal remain
intact. This allows for the donation to have a much greater impact over a long
period of time th<1n if it were spent all at once. Elsewhere, the term is princip'lll)·
applied to Endowl1lent Funds established and operated hy Universities (National
Association of Colleges and University Business Professionals' Endowl1lent
Study, 2007). While the concept may need some further development, it" i~ not
unachievable.
We may conclude that all is not well in the world of systemic <1dvoc<1C)', nnd that
this situation places a grave threat to the maintenance of a healthy del1loer:lC),.
The need to separate the funding mechanism of non-profit human service
organis<1tions from the monitoring, evaluating and regulation of st<1te 11lIIllan
service delivery of progral11s has long heen a conrentious issue hetween the sl:ltC
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and non-government, third sector. Traditionally they have been conflated with
state line agencies both funding and monitoring non-government organisations.
This is sccn as :l major conflict of interest.' To rectify this situation alternative
funding sources need to be made available for systemic adV()C,lcy, alternatives
which nonetheless draw on a public purpose fund and are accountable to the
state, hut not to a specific service department. Such alternatives are not only
possihle, hut already exist in some jurisdictions. Urgent action is required to
support a basis for responsible autonomy within the Third Sector for systemic
I ~at VOG1Cy.
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